We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network. We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the difference between users' willingness to pay and delay costs. We characterize a tight bound of 5/6 on efficiency in pure strategy equilibria when there is zero latency at zero flow and a tight bound of 2 √ 2 − 2 with positive latency at zero flow. These bounds are tight even when the numbers of routes and oligopolists are arbitrarily large.
Introduction
We analyze price competition in the presence of congestion costs. Consider the following environment: one unit of traffic can use one of I alternative routes. More traffic on a particular route causes delays, exerting a negative (congestion) externality on existing traffic.
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Congestion costs are captured by a route-specific non-decreasing convex latency function, l i (·). Profit-maximizing oligopolists set prices (tolls) for travel on each route denoted by p i . We analyze subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this environment, where for each price vector, p, all traffic chooses the path that has minimum (delay plus toll) cost, l i + p i , and oligopolists choose prices to maximize profits.
The environment we analyze is of practical importance for a number of settings. These include transportation and communication networks, where additional use of a route (path) generates greater congestion for all users, and markets in which there are "snob" effects, so that goods consumed by fewer other consumers are more valuable (see for example, [53] ). The key feature of these environments is the negative congestion externality that users exert on others. This externality has been well-recognized since the work by Pigou [40] in economics, by [46] , [57] , [5] in transportation networks, and by [36] , [24] , [23] , [30] in communication networks. More recently, there has been a growing literature that focuses on quantification of efficiency loss (referred to as the price of anarchy) that results from externalities and strategic behavior in different classes of problems: selfish routing (e.g., [25] , [45] , [10] , [11] , [39] and [15] ); resource allocation by market mechanisms (e.g., [22] , [47] , [31] , [59] ); network design (e.g., [3] ); and twostage competitive facility location without congestion costs and externalities (e.g., [54] ). Nevertheless, the game-theoretic interactions between (multiple) service providers and users, or the effects of competition among the providers on the efficiency loss has not been considered in networks with congestion (externalities). This is an important area for analysis since in most networks congestion is a first-order issue and (competing) profit-maximizing entities charge prices for use. Moreover, we will show that the nature of the analysis changes significantly in the presence of price competition.
We provide a general framework for the analysis of price competition among service providers 2 in a congested (and potentially capacitated) network, study existence of pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibria, and characterize and quantify the efficiency properties of equilibria. There are four sets of major results from our analysis.
First, though the equilibrium of traffic assignment without prices can be highly inefficient (e.g., [40] , [45] , [10] ), price-setting by a monopolist internalizes the negative externality and achieves efficiency.
Second, increasing competition can increase inefficiency. In fact, changing the market structure from monopoly to duopoly almost always increases inefficiency. This result contrasts with most existing results in the economics literature where greater competition tends to improve the allocation of resources (e.g. see Tirole [51] ). The intuition for this result, which is related to congestion, is illustrated by the example we discuss below.
Third and most important, we provide tight bounds on the extent of inefficiency in the presence of oligopolistic competition. We show that when latency at zero flow (traffic) is equal to zero, social surplus (defined as the difference between users' willingness to pay and the delay cost) in any pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium is always greater than 5/6 of the maximum social surplus. When latency at zero flow can be positive, there is a slightly lower bound of 2 √ 2 − 2 ≈ 0.828. These bounds are independent of both the number of routes, I, which could be arbitrarily large, and how these routes are distributed across different oligopolists (i.e., of market structure). Simple examples reach these bounds. Finally, we also show that pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist. This is not surprising in view of the fact that what we have here is a version of a Bertrand-Edgeworth game where pure strategy equilibria do not exist in the presence of convex costs of production or capacity constraints (e.g., [14] , [49] , [7] , [56] ). However, in our oligopoly environment when latency functions are linear, a pure strategy equilibrium always exists, essentially because congestion externalities remove the payoff discontinuities inherent in the Bertrand-Edgeworth game. Non-existence becomes an issue when latency functions are highly convex. In this case, we prove that mixed strategy equilibria always exist. We also show that mixed strategy equilibria can lead to arbitrarily inefficient worst-case realizations; in particular, social surplus can become arbitrarily small relative to the maximum social surplus, though the average performance of mixed strategy equilibria is much better.
The following example illustrates some of our results.
Example 1 Figure 1 shows a situation similar to the one first analyzed by Pigou [40] to highlight the inefficiency due to congestion externalities. One unit of traffic will travel from origin A to destination B, using either route 1 or route 2. The latency functions are given by
It is straightforward to see that the efficient allocation [i.e., one that minimizes the total delay cost i l i (x i )x i ] is x Finally, consider a duopoly situation, where each route is controlled by a different profit-maximizing provider. In this case, it can be shown that equilibrium prices will take the form p , which also differs from the efficient allocation. We will show that this is generally the case in the oligopoly equilibrium. Interestingly, while in the Wardrop equilibrium without prices, there was too much traffic on route 1, now there is too little traffic because of its greater markup. It is also noteworthy that although the duopoly equilibrium is inefficient relative to the monopoly equilibrium, in the monopoly equilibrium k is chosen such that all of the consumer surplus is captured by the monopolist, while in the oligopoly equilibrium users may have positive consumer surplus. 4 The intuition for the inefficiency of duopoly relative to monopoly is related to a new source of (differential) monopoly power for each duopolist, which they exploit by distorting the pattern of traffic: when provider 1, controlling route 1, charges a higher price, it realizes that this will push some traffic from route 1 to route 2, raising congestion on route 2. But this makes the traffic using route 1 become more "locked-in," because their outside option, travel on the route 2, has become worse. 5 As a result, the optimal price that each duopolist charges will include an additional markup over the Pigovian markup. These are x 1 l 2 for route 1 and x 2 l 1 for route 2. Since these two markups are generally different, they will distort the pattern of traffic away from the efficient allocation. Naturally, however, prices are typically lower with duopoly, so even though social surplus declines, users will be better off than in monopoly (i.e., they will command a positive consumer surplus).
There is a large literature on models of congestion both in transportation and communication networks (e.g. [5] , [38] , [44] , [33] , [34] , [45] ). 6 However, very few studies have 4 Consumer surplus is the difference between users' willingness to pay (reservation price) and effective costs, p i + l i (x i ), and is thus different from social surplus (which is the difference between users' willingness to pay and latency cost, l i (x i ), thus also takes into account producer surplus/profits). See [32] . 5 Using economics terminology, we could also say that the demand for route 1 becomes more "inelastic". Since this term has a different meaning in the communication networks literature (see [48] ), we do not use it here.
6 Some of these papers also use prices (or tolls) to induce flow patterns that optimize overall system objective, and a number of studies have characterized the "toll set", i.e., the set of all tolls that investigated the implications of having the "property rights" over routes assigned to profit-maximizing providers. In [4] , Basar and Srikant analyze monopoly pricing under specific assumptions on the utility and latency functions. He and Walrand [19] study competition and cooperation among internet service providers under specific demand models. Issues of efficient allocation of flows or traffic across routes do not arise in these papers. Our previous work [1] studies the monopoly problem and contains the efficiency of the monopoly result, but none of the other results here. More recent independent work by [3] builds on [1] and also studies competition among service providers. Using a different mathematical approach, they provide non-tight bounds on the efficiency loss for the case of elastic traffic. Finally, in current work, [2] , we extend some of the results of this paper to a network with parallel-serial structure.
In the rest of the paper, we use the terminology of a (communication) network, though all of the analysis applies to resource allocation in transportation networks, electricity markets, and other economic applications. Section 2 describes the basic environment. Section 3 briefly characterizes the monopoly equilibrium and establishes its efficiency. Section 4 defines and characterizes the oligopoly equilibria with competing profit-maximizing providers. Section 5 contains the main results and characterizes the efficiency properties of the oligopoly equilibrium and provide bounds on efficiency. Section 6 provides a tight efficiency bound when there may be positive latency at zero flow. Section 7 contains concluding comments.
Regarding notation, all vectors are viewed as column vectors, and inequalities are to be interpreted componentwise. We denote by R I + the set of nonnegative I-dimensional vectors. Let C i be a closed subset of [0, ∞) and let f : C i → R be a convex function. We use ∂f (x) to denote the set of subgradients of f at x, and f − (x) and f + (x) to denote the left and right derivatives of f at x.
Model
We consider a network with I parallel links. Let I = {1, . . . , I} denote the set of links. We are interested in the problem of routing d units of flow across the I links. We assume that this is the aggregate flow of many "small" users and thus adopt the Wardrop's principle (see [57] ) in characterizing the flow distribution in the network; i.e., the flows are routed along paths with minimum effective cost, defined as the sum of the latency at the given flow and the price of that path (see the definition below).
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We also assume that the users have a reservation utility R and decide not to send their flow if the effective cost exceeds the reservation utility. This implies that user preferences can be induce optimal flows, with the goal of choosing tolls from this set according to secondary criteria, e.g., minimizing the total amount of tolls or the number of tolled routes; see [8] , [21] , [28] , [27] , and [20] . 7 Wardrop's principle is used extensively in modelling traffic behavior in transportation networks, e.g., [5] , [12] , [38] , [50] , and in communication networks, e.g., [45] , [10] . To account for additional side constraints in the traffic equilibrium problem, including capacity constraints on the links, we use the following definition of a WE (see [29] , [26] ). Lemma 1 shows that this definition is equivalent to the more standard definition of a WE used in the literature under some assumptions.
Definition 1 For a given price vector
We denote the set of WE at a given p by W (p).
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ I, the latency function
, convex, nondecreasing, and satisfies l i (0) = 0.
The assumption of zero latency at zero flow, i.e., l i (0) = 0, implies that all latency is due to flow of traffic, and there are no fixed latency costs.
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It is adopted to simplify the discussion, especially the characterization of equilibrium prices in Proposition 9 below. A trivial relaxation of this assumption to l i (0) = L for all i ∈ I for some L > 0 will have no effect on any of the results in the paper. Allowing for differential levels of l i (0) complicates the analysis, but has little effect on the major results. This case is discussed in Section 6, where we provide a slightly lower tight bound for the inefficiency of oligopoly equilibria without this assumption.
Another feature of Assumption 1 is that it allows latency functions to be extended real-valued, thus allowing for capacity constraints. Let
Without loss of generality, we can add the constraint x i ∈ C i in Eq. (1) . Using the optimality conditions for problem (1), we see that a vector x ) + p i , are equalized on all links with positive flows.
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 hold, and assume further that
Example 2 below shows that condition (3) in this lemma may not hold when the latency functions are not real-valued. The existence, uniqueness, and continuity properties of a WE are well-studied (see [5] , [12] , [50] ). We provide here the standard proof for existence, based on establishing the equivalence of WE and the optimal solutions of a convex network optimization problem, which we will refer to later in our analysis.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Continuity) Let Assumption 1 hold. For any price vector p ≥ 0, the set of WE, W (p), is nonempty. Moreover, the correspondence W : R I + ⇒ R I + is upper semicontinuous. Proof. Given any p ≥ 0, consider the following optimization problem
subject to
In view of Assumption (1) (i.e., l i is nondecreasing for all i), it can be shown that the objective function of problem (4) is convex over the constraint set, which is nonempty (since 0 ∈ C i ) and convex. Moreover, the first order optimality conditions of problem (4) , which are also sufficient conditions for optimality, are identical to the WE optimality conditions [cf. Eq. (2)]. Hence a flow vector x W E ∈ W (p) if and only if it is an optimal solution of problem (4) . Since the objective function of problem (4) is continuous and the constraint set is compact, this problem has an optimal solution, showing that W (p) is nonempty. The fact that W is an upper semicontinuous correspondence at every p follows by using the Theorem of the Maximum (see Berge [6] , chapter 6) for problem (4) . Q.E.D.
WE flows also satisfy intuitive monotonicity properties given in the following proposition. The proof follows from the optimality conditions [cf. Eq. (2)] and is omitted (see [1] ).
(c) For some I ⊂ I, suppose thatp j < p j for all j ∈ I andp j = p j for all j / ∈ I, and letx ∈ W (p) and x ∈ W (p). Then j∈ Ix j ≥ j∈ I x j .
For a given price vector p, the WE need not be unique in general. The following example illustrates some properties of the WE.
Example 2 Consider a two link network. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 1. Assume that the latency functions are given by
At the price vector (p 1 , p 2 ) = (1, 1), the set of WE, W (p), is given by the set of all vectors (x 1 , x 2 ) with 0 ≤ x i ≤ 2/3 and i x i ≤ 1. At any price vector (p 1 , p 2 ) with
is given by all (0, x 2 ) with 0 ≤ x 2 ≤ 2/3. This example also illustrates that Lemma 1 need not hold when latency functions are not real-valued. Consider, for instance, the price vector (p 1 , p 2 ) = (1 − , 1 − a ) for some scalar a > 1. In this case, the unique WE is (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1/3, 2/3), and clearly effective costs on the two routes are not equalized despite the fact that they both have positive flows. This arises because the path with the lower effective cost is capacity constrained, so no more traffic can use that path.
Under further restrictions on the l i , the following standard result follows (proof omitted).
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness) Let Assumption 1 hold. Assume further that l i is strictly increasing over C i . For any price vector p ≥ 0, the set of WE, W (p), is a singleton. Moreover, the function W :
Since we do not assume that the latency functions are strictly increasing, we need the following lemma in our analysis to deal with nonunique WE flows.
Lemma 2 Let Assumption 1 hold. For a given p ≥ 0, define the set
Then
Proof. Consider some i ∈Ī and x ∈ W (p). Since i ∈Ī, there exists somex ∈ W (p) such that x i =x i . Assume without loss of generality that x i >x i . There are two cases to consider: 
(b) If x k <x k for some k, by the WE optimality conditions, we obtain
Combining the above with x i >x i and x k <x k , we see that
By Assumption 1, this shows that l i (x i ) = 0 (and also that p i = p k ).
Next consider some i, j ∈Ī. We will show that p i = p j . Since i ∈Ī, there exist x,x ∈ W (p) such that x i >x i . There are three cases to consider:
• x j <x j . Then a similar argument to part (b) above shows that p i = p j .
• x j >x j . If x k ≥x k for all k = i, j, then mx m < d, implying that the WE optimality conditions hold withλ = 0. Therefore, we have
• x j =x j . Since j ∈Ī, by definition there must exist some otherx ∈ W (p) such that x j =x j . Repeating the above two steps withx j instead ofx j yields the desired result.
Q.E.D.
Intuitively, this lemma states that if there exist multiple WEs, x,x ∈ W (p) such that x i =x i , then the latency function l i must be locally flat around x i (andx i ). Given the assumption that l i (0) = 0 and the convexity of latency functions, this immediately implies l i (x i ) = 0.
We next define the social problem and the social optimum, which is the routing (flow allocation) that would be chosen by a planner that has full information and full control over the network.
Definition 2 A flow vector x
S is a social optimum if it is an optimal solution of the social problem
In view of Assumption 1, the social problem has a continuous objective function and a compact constraint set, guaranteeing the existence of a social optimum, x S . Moreover, using the optimality conditions for a convex program (see [9] , Section 4.7), we see that a vector x 
For future reference, for a given vector x ∈ R I + , we define the value of the objective function in the social problem,
as the social surplus, i.e., the difference between users' willingness to pay and the total latency.
Monopoly Equilibrium and Efficiency
In this section, we assume that a monopolist service provider owns the I links and charges a price of p i per unit bandwidth on link i. We considered a related problem in [1] for atomic users with inelastic traffic (i.e., the utility function of each of a finite set of users is a step function), and with increasing, real-valued and differentiable latency functions. Here we show that similar results hold for the more general latency functions and the demand model considered in Section 2.
The monopolist sets the prices to maximize his profit given by
where x ∈ W (p). This defines a two-stage dynamic pricing-congestion game, where the monopolist sets prices anticipating the demand of users, and given the prices (i.e., in each subgame), users choose their flow vectors according to the WE.
Our definition of the ME is stronger than the standard subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept for dynamic games. With a slight abuse of terminology, let us associate a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the on-the-equilibrium-path actions of the two-stage game. 
The following proposition shows that under Assumption 1, the two solution concepts coincide. Since the proof is not relevant for the rest of the argument, we provide it in Appendix A.
) is an ME if and only if it is an SPE of the pricing-congestion game.
Since an ME (p * , x * ) is an optimal solution of the optimization problem maximize p≥0, x≥0 i∈I p i x i (9) subject to
it is easier to work with than an SPE. Therefore, we use ME as the solution concept in this paper. The preceding problem has an optimal solution, which establishes the existence of an ME. Moreover, we have: Proposition 5 Let Assumption 1 hold. A vector x is the flow vector at an ME if and only if it is a social optimum. Moreover, if (p, x) is an ME, then for all i with
This proposition therefore establishes that the flow allocation at an ME and the social optimum are the same. Its proof is similar to an analogous result in [1] and is omitted.
In addition to the social surplus defined above, it is also useful to define the consumer surplus, as the difference between users' willingness to pay and effective cost, i.e., [32] ). By Proposition 5, it is clear that even though the ME achieves the social optimum, all of the surplus is captured by the monopolist, and users are just indifferent between sending their information or not (i.e., receive no consumer surplus).
Our major motivation for the study of oligopolistic settings is that they provide a better approximation to reality, where there is typically competition among service providers. A secondary motivation is to see whether an oligopoly equilibrium will achieve an efficient allocation like the ME, while also transferring some or all of the surplus to the consumers.
Oligopoly Equilibrium
We suppose that there are S service providers, denote the set of service providers by S, and assume that each service provider s ∈ S owns a different subset I s of the links. Service provider s charges a price p i per unit bandwidth on link i ∈ I s . Given the vector of prices of links owned by other service providers,
The objective of each service provider, like the monopolist in the previous section, is to maximize profits. Because their profits depend on the prices set by other service providers, each service provider forms conjectures about the actions of other service providers, as well as the behavior of users, which, we assume, they do according to the notion of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. We refer to the game among service providers as the price competition game.
and for all s ∈ S,
We refer to p OE as the OE price.
As for the monopoly case, there is a close relation between a pure strategy OE and a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. Again associating the subgame perfect equilibrium with the on-the-equilibrium-path actions, we have: 
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 4 and enables us to work with the OE definition, which is more convenient for the subsequent analysis. The proof parallels that of Proposition 4 and is omitted.
) is an OE if and only if it is an SPE of the price competition game.
The price competition game is neither concave nor supermodular. Therefore, classical arguments that are used to show the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium do not hold (see [16] , [52] ). In the next proposition, we show that for linear latency functions, there exists a pure strategy OE. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 7 Let Assumption 1 hold, and assume further that the latency functions are linear. Then the price competition game has a pure strategy OE.
The existence result cannot be generalized to piecewise linear latency functions or to latency functions which are linear over their effective domain, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 Consider a two link network. Let the total flow be d = 1. Assume that the latency functions are given by
for some > 0 and δ > 1/2, with the convention that when = 0, l 2 (x) = ∞ for x > δ. We first show that there exists no pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium for small (i.e., there exists no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium). The following list considers all candidate oligopoly price equilibria (p 1 , p 2 ) and profitable unilateral deviations for sufficiently small, thus establishing the nonexistence of an OE:
1. p 1 = p 2 = 0: A small increase in the price of provider 1 will generate positive profits, thus provider 1 has an incentive to deviate.
For sufficiently small, the profit function of player 2, given p 1 , is strictly increasing as a function of p 2 , showing that provider 2 has an incentive to increase its price.
We next show that a mixed strategy OE always exists. We define a mixed strategy OE as a mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the price competition game (see Dasgupta and Maskin, [13] ). Let B n be the space of all (Borel) probability measures on [0, R] n . Let I s denote the cardinality of I s , i.e., the number of links controlled by service provider s. Let µ s ∈ B I s be a probability measure, and denote the vector of these probability measures by µ and the vector of these probability measures excluding s by µ −s .
for all s and µ s ∈ B
Is
. Therefore, a mixed strategy OE simply requires that there be no profitable deviation to a different probability measure for each oligopolist.
Example 3 (continued)
We now show that the following strategy profile is the unique mixed strategy OE for the above game when → 0 (a mixed strategy OE also exists when > 0, but its structure is more complicated and less informative):
otherwise.
Notice that µ 1 has an atom equal to 1 − δ at R. To verify that this profile is a mixed strategy OE, let µ be the density of µ, with the convention that µ = ∞ when there is an atom at that point.
is a mixed strategy equilibrium, it suffices to show that the expected payoff to player i is constant for all p i ∈ M i when the other player chooses p −i according to µ −i (see [37] ). These expected payoffs arē
The WE demand x (p 1 , p 2 ) takes the simple form of
The exact value of x 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 1 when p 1 = p 2 is immaterial since this event happens with zero probability. It is evident that the expression in (12) is constant for all p i ∈ M i for i = 1, 2 given µ 1 and µ 2 above. This establishes that (µ 1 , µ 2 ) is a mixed strategy OE. It can also be verified that there are no other mixed strategy equilibria.
The next proposition, which is proved in Appendix B, establishes that a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists. We next provide an explicit characterization of pure strategy OE. Though of also independent interest, these results are most useful for us to quantify the efficiency loss of oligopoly in the next section.
The following lemma shows that an equivalent to Lemma 1 (which required realvalued latency functions) also holds with more general latency functions at the pure strategy OE.
) is a pure strategy OE, then
i∈I
with i∈I x (14) and (15) follow by the definition of a WE. Consider condition (13) . Assume that there exist some i, j ∈ I with x
Using the optimality conditions for a WE [cf. Eq. (2) 
Note that units of flow are moved from link m to link j such that the flows of other links remain the same at the new WE. Hence, the change in the profit is The following example shows that Assumption 2 cannot be dispensed with for part (b) of this lemma.
Example 4 Consider a three link network with two providers, where provider 1 owns links 1 and 3 and provider 2 owns link 2. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 1. Assume that the latency functions are given by
for some a > 0. Any price vector (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) = (2/3, 1/3, b) with b ≥ 2/3 and (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = (2/3, 1/3, 0) is a pure strategy OE, so p 3 x 3 = 0 contrary to part (b) of the lemma. To see why this is an equilibrium, note that provider 2 is clearly playing a best response. Moreover, in this allocation Π 1 = 4/9. We can represent any deviation of provider 1 by
for two scalars and δ , which will induce a WE of (
The corresponding profit of provider 1 at this deviation is Π 1 = 4/9 − δ 2 < 4/9, establishing that provider 1 is also playing a best response and we have a pure strategy OE.
We next establish that, under an additional mild assumption, a pure strategy OE will never be at a point of non-differentiability of the latency functions.
Assumption 3 There exists some s ∈ S such that l i is real-valued and continuously differentiable for all i ∈ I s .
> 0 for some i. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then respectively.
Since the proof of this lemma is long, it is given in Appendix C. Note that Assumption 3 cannot be dispensed with in this lemma. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 5 Consider a two link network. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 2. Assume that the latency functions are given by
It can be verified that the vector (p
is a pure strategy OE, and is at a point of non-differentiability for both latency functions.
We next provide an explicit characterization of the OE prices, which is essential in our efficiency analysis in Section 5. The proof is given in Appendix D.
> 0 for some i ∈ I. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Then, for all s ∈ S and i ∈ I s , we have
Moreover, if there exists some i ∈ I such that I s = {i} for some s ∈ S, then
If the latency functions l i are all real-valued and continuously differentiable, then analysis of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for oligopoly problem [problem (81) in Appendix D] immediately yields the following result:
> 0 for some i ∈ I. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume also that l i is real-valued and continuously differentiable for all i. Then, for all s ∈ S and i ∈ I s , we have
, otherwise.
This corollary also implies that in the two link case with real-valued and continuously differentiable latency functions and with minimum effective cost less than R, the OE prices are p
as claimed in the Introduction.
Efficiency of Oligopoly Equilibria
This section contains our main results, providing tight bounds on the inefficiency of oligopoly equilibria. We take as our measure of efficiency the ratio of the social surplus of the equilibrium flow allocation to the social surplus of the social optimum,
, where x * refers to the monopoly or the oligopoly equilibrium [cf. Eq. (8)]. Section 3 established that the flow allocation at a monopoly equilibrium is a social optimum. Hence, in congestion games with monopoly pricing, there is no efficiency loss. The following example shows that this is not necessarily the case with oligopoly pricing.
Example 6 Consider a two link network. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 1. The latency functions are given by
The unique social optimum for this example is x S = (1, 0). The unique ME (p 1) . As expected, the flow allocations at the social optimum and the ME are the same. Next consider a duopoly where each of these links is owned by a different provider. Using Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, it follows that the flow allocation at the OE, x OE , satisfies
Solving this together with x OE 1 + x OE 2 = 1 shows that the flow allocation at the unique oligopoly equilibrium is x OE = (2/3, 1/3). The social surplus at the social optimum, the monopoly equilibrium, and the oligopoly equilibrium are given by 1, 1, and 5/6, respectively.
Before providing a more thorough analysis of the efficiency properties of the OE, the next proposition proves that, as claimed in the Introduction and suggested by Example 6, a change in the market structure from monopoly to duopoly in a two link network typically reduces efficiency. 
Proof. Combining the OE prices with the WE conditions, we have
where we use the fact that min j {p
Moreover, we can use optimality conditions (7) to prove that a vector (x S 1 , x S 2 ) > 0 is a social optimum if and only if
We next quantify the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria by providing a tight bound on the efficiency loss in congestion games with oligopoly pricing. As we have shown in Section 4, such games do not always have a pure strategy OE. In the following, we first provide bounds on congestion games that have pure strategy equilibria. We next study efficiency properties of mixed strategy equilibria.
Pure Strategy Equilibria
We consider price competition games that have pure strategy equilibria (this set includes, but is substantially larger than, games with linear latency functions, see Section 4). We consider latency functions that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Let L I denote the set of latency functions for which the associated price competition game has a pure strategy OE and the individual l i 's satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
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We refer to an element of the set L I by {l i } i∈I . Given a parallel link network with I links and latency functions {l i } i∈I ∈ L I , let − − → OE({l i }) denote the set of flow allocations at an OE. We define the efficiency metric at some x
where x S is a social optimum given the latency functions {l i } i∈I and R is the reservation utility. In other words, our efficiency metric is the ratio of the social surplus in an equilibrium relative to the surplus in the social optimum. Following the literature on the "price of anarchy", in particular [25] , we are interested in the worst performance in an oligopoly equilibrium, so we look for a lower bound on
We first prove two lemmas, which reduce the set of latency functions that need to be considered in bounding the efficiency metric. The next lemma allows us to use the oligopoly price characterization given in Proposition 9. 
Then every
is a social optimum and every
is a feasible solution to the social problem [problem (6)], we have
By the definition of a WE, we have x 
is an optimal solution of the problem
Substituting for (p i ) i∈I s in the above, we obtain maximize x≥0
= R} is either a singleton or a closed interval. Since this is a convex problem, using the optimality conditions, we obtain
where g l i ∈ ∂l i (x OE i ). By Eq. (7), it follows that x OE is a social optimum. Q.E.D.
This lemma implies that in finding a lower bound on the efficiency metric, we can restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, to latency functions {l i } ∈ L I such that (2) and (7), we obtain
, we see that
> x
S j and completing the proof. Q.E.D.
Two Links
We first consider a parallel link network with two links owned by two service providers. The next theorem provides a tight lower bound of 5/6 on r 2 
Starting with the two-link network is useful two reasons: first, the two-link network avoids the additional layer of optimization over the allocation of links to service providers in characterizing the bound on inefficiency; and second, we will prove the result for the general case by reducing it to the proof of the two-link case.
Although the details of the proof of the theorem are involved, the structure is straightforward. The problem of finding a lower bound on r 2 ({l i }, x OE ) is an infinite-dimensional problem, since the minimization is over latency functions. The proof first lower-bounds the infinite-dimensional problem by the optimal value of a finite-dimensional optimization problem using the relations between the flows at social optimum and equilibrium, and convexity of the latency functions. It then shows that the solution will involve one of the links having zero latency. Finally, using this fact and the price characterization from Proposition 9, it reduces the problem of characterizing the bound on inefficiency to a simple minimization problem, with optimal value 5/6. An intuition for this value is provided below.
In the following, we assume without loss of generality that d = 1. Also recall that latency functions in L 2 satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
Theorem 1 Consider a two link network where each link is owned by a different provider. Then 
Proof. The proof follows a number of steps:
Step 1: We are interested in finding a lower bound for the problem
Given
and let x S be a social optimum. By Lemmas 7 and 8, we can assume that 
where we define problem (E ) as
+ {Oligopoly Equilibrium Constraints} t , t = 1, 2.
Problem (E ) can be viewed as a finite dimensional problem that captures the equilibrium and the social optimum characteristics of the infinite dimensional problem given in Eq. (23) . This implies that instead of optimizing over the entire function l i , we optimize over the possible values of l i (·) and ∂l i (·) at the equilibrium and the social optimum, which we denote by l i , l i , l (27) and (28) follow from the optimality conditions for the social optimum. Condition (30) follows by the convexity of the function l 1 (·), which implies the relation
we write the preceding constraint as
which turns out to be more convenient in the analysis of the optimality conditions (see Step 3) . Similarly, condition (31) follows by the facts that we are considering {l i } such that x
Note that we use the relaxed constraint Finally, the last set of constraints are the necessary conditions for a pure strategy OE. These are written separately for t = 1, 2, for the two cases characterized in Proposition 9, giving us two bounds, which we will show to be equal.
More explicitly, the Oligopoly Equilibrium constraints are given by: 
where (17), (18)]. We will show in Step 4 that r OE 2,1 ( ) = r OE 2,2 ( ). Note that given any feasible solution of problem (23) , there exists some > 0 such that we have a feasible solution for problem (E ) with the same objective function value. Therefore, the optimum value of problem inf >0 r OE 2,t ( ) is indeed a lower bound on the optimum value of problem (23).
Step 2: Let (l 2 satisfy Eqs. (25)- (29) . We show that
Using Eqs. (27) , (28) , and (29), we obtain 
Step 3:
) denote an optimal solution of problem (E). We show thatl (25), (27) , (28), respectively, and θ S ≥ 0 to Eq. (29) . Using the first order optimality conditions, we obtainȳ
We first show thatl 
which follows because any vector (y OE i , l i , l i ) with l 1 = 0 and l 1 = 0 that satisfies Eqs. (33) or (34) is a feasible solution to the above problem. It is straightforward to show that the optimal solution of this problem is (l 2 ,l 2 ,ȳ
), and therefore it follows that r OE 2,t ( ) = 5/6 for all t = 1, 2 and all > 0. By Eq. (24), this implies that
We next show that this bound is tight. Consider the latency functions l 1 (x) = 0, and l 2 (x) = 
Q.E.D.
It is instructive to briefly consider the intuition underlying the 5/6 bound. The efficiency loss is maximized when as much of the traffic as possible goes through route 2 and when the latency on route 2 is as high as possible, i.e., when x 2 l 2 (x 2 ) is maximized. But these two requirements are in conflict in the sense that when the latency on route 2 is high, there will be less traffic on that route, because in a WE we must have p 1 + l 1 (x 1 ) = p 2 + l 2 (x 2 ). Moreover, with zero latency on route 1, equilibrium prices will satisfy p 1 = x 1 l 2 (x 2 ) and p 2 = x 2 l 2 (x 2 ). So the problem is to maximize x 2 l 2 (x 2 ) while satisfying
. This constraint immediately implies that x 1 > x 2 , and since l 2 (x 2 ) ≤ R, the efficiency loss can never exceed 1/2. But the bound is in fact much tighter than this. Since x 1 > x 2 , convexity of l 2 , i.e., a greater l 2 given l 2 , is harmful for the objective, since it tends to increase x 1 (as the inspection of the condition x 1 l 2 (x 2 ) = x 2 l 2 (x 2 ) + l 2 (x 2 ) shows). This reasoning suggests that the worst case will happen when l 2 is linear, which is exactly the case in our Example 6, leading to the efficiency loss of 1/6 and the bound of 5/6.
Multiple Links
We next consider the general case where we have a parallel link network with I links and S service providers, and provider s owns a set of links I s ⊂ I. It can be seen by augmenting a two link network with links that have latency functions
that the lower bound in the general network case can be no higher than 5/6. However, this is a degenerate example in the sense that at the OE, the flows of the links with latency functions given above are equal to 0. We next give an example of an I link network which has positive flows on all links at the OE and an efficiency metric of 5/6.
Example 7
Consider an I link network where each link is owned by a different provider. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 1. The latency functions are given by
The unique social optimum for this example is x
. It can be seen that the flow allocation at the unique OE is
, . . . , 1 3 (I − 1) .
Hence, the efficiency metric for this example is
The next theorem generalizes Theorem 1 to a parallel link network with I ≥ 2 links. The new feature here is not only the existence of more than two links, but also the fact that to find the worst-case bound, we have to optimize over the allocation of links across service providers. The strategy of the proof is again to reduce the infinite-dimensional program to a finite-dimensional optimization problem, and then show that it reduces to the case in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Consider a general parallel link network with I links and S service providers, where provider s owns a set of links I s ⊂ I. Then
and the bound is tight, i.e., there exists {l i } i∈I ∈ L I and x OE ∈ − − → OE({l i }) that attains the lower bound in Eq. (57).
Proof. The proof again follows a number of steps:
Step 1: Consider the problem 
where r OE I,t ( ) is the optimum value of the following finite dimensional problem, which we denote by (E I ):
i∈I y OE i = 1,
The new feature relative to the two link case is the presence of I s 's as choice variables to allow a choice over possible distribution of links across service providers (with the constraint s I s = I left implicit). The oligopoly equilibrium constraints, which are again written separately for t = 1, 2 for the two cases in Proposition 9, depend on I i 's. In addition, we have added constraint (47) to impose Assumption 2 (recall that x OE 1 > 0 by Lemma 4).
Step 2: (45) and (46)], and also I s = {1}. Therefore, using the price characterization from Proposition 9, the structure of the problem simplifies to
y
where we have also used the fact thatl S i = 0, for i = 2, . . . , I. The first set of constraints are due to the convexity assumptions on the l i . Similar to the two link case, the second set of constraints are due to the oligopoly equilibrium constraints (givenl 1 = 0, see the OE price characterization in Proposition 9).
Step 4: 
By feasibility [cf. Eq. (51)], we haveȳ 
it can be seen that the optimal value of problem (48) is the same as the optimal value of the following problem:
which is identical to problem (41) in the two-link case, showing that for all t = 1, 2 and all > 0,
Hence, we have
Finally, Example 7 shows that the preceding bound is tight, i.e.,
Q.E.D.
A notable feature of Example 7 and this theorem is that the (tight) lower bound on inefficiency is independent of the number of links I. Thus arbitrarily large networks can feature as much inefficiency as small networks. 13 
Mixed Strategy Equilibria
As we illustrated in Section 4, pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium may fail to exist (cf. Example 3). Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 8, such games always have a mixed strategy equilibrium. In this section, we discuss the efficiency properties of mixed strategy OE.
Although there has been much less interest in the efficiency properties of mixed strategy equilibria, two different types of efficiency metrics present themselves as natural candidates. The first considers the worst realization of the strategies, while the second focuses on average inefficiency across different realizations of mixed strategies. We refer to the first metric as worst-realization metric, and denote it byr W I ({l i }), and to the second as the average metric, and denote it byr
Given a set of latency functions {l i } i∈I , let OM ({l i }) denote the set of mixed strategy equilibria. For some µ ∈ OM ({l i }), let M i (µ) denote the support of µ i as defined before in Example 3 [in particular, recall that
We define the worst-realization efficiency metric as
where r I is given by Eq. (21). Similarly, the average efficiency metric is defined as
In the next example, we show that the worst-realization efficiency metric for games with no pure strategy equilibrium can be arbitrarily low.
Example 3 (continued) Consider the prices p 1 = R and p 2 = R(1 − δ) that satisfy p i ∈ M i for the unique mixed strategy equilibrium given in Example 3 as → 0. The WE at these prices is given by x
and the worst-realization efficiency metric is
which as δ → 1 goes to 0. On the other hand, as → 0, the average efficiency metric,r
where r (p 1 , p 2 ) is the inefficiency at the price vector (p 1 , p 2 ) at the unique mixed strategy OE characterized above. Therefore:
and thus,r
Thus to calculater
A I ({l i }), we need to compute the last integral. Denoting this by A, we have
Now recall that µ 1 has an atom equal to 1 − δ at R, so
It can be calculated that A reaches a maximum of approximately 0.16 for δ ≈ 0.8. Therefore, in this example,r A I ({l i }) reaches 0.84 ≈ 5/6 (in fact, slightly greater than 5/6). We conjecture, but are unable to prove, that 5/6 is also a lower bound for the average efficiency metric,r A I ({l i }), in mixed strategy OE. This is left as an open research question. 14 
Bound for Positive Latency at Zero Flow
In this section, we relax the assumption l i (0) = 0, and allow positive latency at zero flow. To simplify the exposition in this section, we focus on continuously differentiable latency functions, but as our previous analysis indicates, the main result, Theorem 3, holds for general convex latency functions.
Assumption 4 For each i ∈ I, the latency function l
is continuously differentiable, convex, and nondecreasing.
We first provide an equilibrium price characterization, which generalizes Corollary 1.
Let Assumptions 2 and 4 hold. Then, for all s ∈ S and i ∈ I s and i / ∈ N , we have
The proof of this theorem follows immediately from the proof of Corollary 1. In particular, N is the set of all latencies where x OE i = 0, so that any i ∈ N can be discarded when considering the individual optimization problem of each service provider. In what follows, let L * I denote the set of latency functions for which the associated price competition game has a pure strategy OE and the individual l i 's satisfy Assumptions 2 and 4.
Theorem 3 Consider a general parallel link network with I links and S service providers, where provider s owns a set of links I s ⊂ I. Then
and the bound is tight, i.e., there exists {l i } i∈I ∈ L * I and x Following the same line of argument, it can be seen that problem (23) can further be bounded below by a problem identical to (48) except that constraint (49) is replaced by
Using a similar transformation, this problem can be seen to be equivalent to
The optimal solution of this problem is (l,l ,l
1 − √ 2/2) and the corresponding optimal value is 2 √ 2 − 2.
We next show that this bound is tight. Consider an I link parallel network where each link is owned by a different provider. Let the total flow be d = 1 and the reservation utility be R = 1. The latency functions are given by l 1 (x) = 0, and
The corresponding OE flow vector is
and the social optimum is x S = (1, 0). Hence, the efficiency metric for these latency functions is r I ({l i },
It is interesting to note that 2 √ 2 − 2 ≈ .828 ≤ 5/6. Therefore, relaxing the assumption l i (0) = 0 has a small effect on the worst-case performance of a pure strategy OE. In terms of the intuition we provided for Theorem 1, the fact that l 2 (0) can be positive allows us to increase l 2 slightly for a given l 2 , leading to a small deterioration in performance.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an analysis of competition in congested networks. We established a number of results. First, despite the potential inefficiencies of flow-routing without prices, price-setting by a monopolist always achieves the social optimum. Second, and in contrast to the monopoly result, oligopoly equilibria where multiple service providers compete are typically inefficient. Third and most importantly, when latency at zero flow is zero, there is a tight bound of 5/6 on inefficiency in pure strategy oligopoly equilibria. When latency at zero flow can be positive, the bound is slightly lower at 2 √ 2 − 2 ≈ .828. These bounds apply even for arbitrarily large parallel link networks.
A number of concluding comments are useful:
• Our motivating example has been the flow of information in a communication network, but our results apply equally to traffic assignment problems and oligopoly in product markets with negative externalities, congestion or snob effects (as originally suggested by Veblen [53] ).
• Our analysis has been quite general, in particular, allowing for constant latencies and capacity constraints. Some of the analysis simplifies considerably when we specialize the network to increasing and real-valued (non-capacity constrained) latencies.
• On the other hand, our analysis has been simplified by our focus on parallel link networks. We have started extending this analysis in ongoing work [2] for topologies consisting of parallel-serial structure. This parallel-serial topology, however, rules out many interesting cases, including those that could potentially lead to Braess' paradox, and the analysis for more general topologies is an open area for future research.
• One simplifying feature of our analysis is the assumption that users are "homogeneous" in the sense that the same reservation utility, R, applies to all users. It is possible to conduct a similar analysis with elastic and heterogeneous users (or traffic), but this raises a number of new and exciting challenges. For example, monopoly or oligopoly providers might want to use non-linear pricing (designed as a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility constraints of different types of users, e.g., [58] ). This is an important research area for understanding equilibria in communication networks, where users often have heterogeneous quality of service requirements.
• While we have established that worst-realization efficiency metric in mixed strategy oligopoly equilibria can be arbitrarily low, a bound for average efficiency metric is an open research question. 
If W (p) is a singleton, we immediately obtain a contradiction. Assume that W (p) is not a singleton and i∈I x i = i∈Ix i for all x,x ∈ W (p). By Lemma 2, it follows that Π(p,x) = Π(p, x) for all x ∈ W (p), which contradicts the fact that (p
) is an SPE.
Assume finally that W (p) is not a singleton and
For this case, we have p i = R for all i ∈Ī, wherē
[cf. Eq. (5)]. To see this, note that since i∈Ix i < d, the WE optimality conditions for x [cf. Eq. (2) 
where
The preceding relation together with Eq. (58) contradicts the fact that (p
) is an SPE, thus establishing our claim.
We first show that
Assume to arrive at a contradiction that
This implies that there exists some j ∈Ī such that x j <x j (which also implies that x j < b C j ). We use the WE optimality conditions [Eq. (2)] forx and x to obtain the following:
• There exists someλ ≥ 0 such that for some i ∈Ī, For all i ∈ I, let l i (x) = a i x. Define the set
Let I 0 denote the cardinality of set I 0 . There are two cases to consider: Lemma 4(b) , it can be seen that x i > 0 for all i ∈ I s andx i > 0 for all i ∈ I s . We claim that p i = p for all i ∈ I s andp i =p for all i ∈ I s . This can be seen by checking the first order optimality conditions of problem (67) and follows by the linearity of the latency functions. Assume to arrive at a contradiction that p >p. Since p T s x s =p T sx s , this implies that i∈Is x i < i∈Isx i . There are two cases to consider:
Since p i + a i x i < R, it follows by the definition of a Wardrop equilibrium that i∈I x i = d. One can also immediately see thatx j ≥ x j for all j / ∈ I s . Together with i∈I s x i < i∈I sx i , this implies that i∈I x i < i∈Ix i , which contradicts the fact that i∈I x i = d.
If both effective costs are equal to R, i.e., 
The first order conditions of problem (67) in this case yields
Moreover, in view of the relation between the effective costs, it can be seen that N ⊂N . Since i∈I s x i < i∈I sx i , we have x i <x i for some i ∈ I s , which by the preceding implies that p i <p i , yielding a contradiction.
Q.E.D. (4), we see that the objective function of problem (4) is strictly convex in 
sk be a one-to-one, continuous function. LetP (s) be a subset of P , such that
In other words,P (s) is a lower dimensional subset of P (which is also of Lebesgue measure zero). Theorem 5* in [13] 
Given p ≥ 0, since p j = p k for all j, k ∈Ī, whereĪ is defined in Eq. (5) 
Assume the contrary. This implies that there exist somep ≥ 0, s ∈ S, and x ∈ W (p) such that 
which is a lower dimensional set. This establishes the desired condition for Theorem A1.
Finally, we show that
is continuous at all p. Given some p ≥ 0, defineĪ as in Eq. (5) 
and
which, when combined, yields 
Using the same line of argument as above, we obtain
Let 1 ∈ I s , and without loss of any generality, assume that all l i 's for i ∈ I s are smooth (recall Assumption 3). For all i ∈ I s , i = 1, we obtain
.
To arrive at a contradiction, assume that l
) for some j / ∈ I s . Then the preceding two sets of equations imply that
for all i ∈ I s . Next, Eqs. (75) and (76) for multiple link case are given by
which are inconsistent with Eq. (79), leading to a contradiction. This proves the claim for the multiple link case. Q.E.D.
function is differentiable, see Rockafellar [42] ). Therefore, by examining the KarushKuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem, we obtain , otherwise,
showing the result in Eq. (16) . We next assume that min j {p subject to
where T i = {x i | p
OE i
+ l i (x i ) = R} is either a singleton or a closed interval. Since this is a convex problem, using the optimality conditions, we obtain R − l i (x .
